| • • • | nitized Copy Appro | IOP SE | CKLI | | | i ja skojo je ina n |
|-------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|--|--|---------------------|
| | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | 7 |
| | | A second | | | | 111 |
| | | | | 18 May 19 | 51 | il de |
| | , | | | - N- | | 25X1 |
| | | | | Copy No. | | |
| | • | | | en e | | • |
| | | | -1105 5111 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | |
| | CURRE | NT INTELLIG | ENCE BUI | LLETIN | | • |
| • | | | 4 magnitude | JINO Y | And the second s | |
| | | | NO CHAN | NT NO | | |
| | | | CLASS. C | HANGED TO: TS VIEW DATE: | 5 2001 | · . |
| | | | AUTH: H | IR 70-275 REVIEWS | :R | 25 X 1 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | • | | · | 25 |
| | | | • | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | • 4 | | | | 4 |
| | Off | ice of Current | Intelligen | ce | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | CENTR | AL INTELLIG | ENCE AGI | ENCY | · · · · · | |
| | | · | | | | 25. |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | • |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| . • | | | | | | , |
| | | | | | | |

TOP SECRET

SUMMARY

GENERAL

1. Indonesia favors USSR and Communist China participation in Japanese peace treaty, but will sign regardless (page 3).

FAR EAST

2. Major Communist effort seen in central sector (page 3).

NEAR EAST

- 4. USSR urges Iran to accept planes to combat locust plague USSR IRAN (page 4).
- 6. Iraq sends an air squadron for "Syria's protection" (page 6). निवास

WESTERN EUROPE

- Projected French military expenditures for 1952 greater than foreseen (page 6).
- Spanish relations with France near breaking point (page 8). SPATIN, F-R

25X1

25X1

Norwegian Foreign Office favors admission of Greece and Turkey 11. to NATO (page 9).

GREICH

- 2 -

| | GENERAL |
|----|--|
| 1. | Indonesia favors USSR and Communist China participation in Japanese |
| | peace treaty, but will sign regardless: |
| | The Indonesian Foreign Minister has informally |
| | told the US Ambassador in Djakarta that, in |
| | line with Indonesia's independent foreign |
| | policy, his government would like to see |
| | both Soviet Russia and Communist China participate in the Japanese peace treaty. He added, however, that if this should not prove feasible, |
| | Indonesia would be willing to go ahead without them. |
| | |
| | Comment: Subardjo's statement represents |
| | the first time an Asian nation has committed itself to participate in a Japanese peace treaty which was boycotted by the USSR and from which |
| | |
| | |
| | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a |
| | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is |
| | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a |
| | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a |
| | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a |
| 2 | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the past 24 hours strongly indicate a new offensive effort." It concludes that while the enemy is still capable of |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the past 24 hours strongly indicate a new offensive effort." It concludes that while the enemy is still capable of launching a major attack along the eastern approaches to Seoul, the |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the past 24 hours strongly indicate a new offensive effort." It concludes that while the enemy is still capable of launching a major attack along the eastern approaches to Seoul, the recent shift of major Chinese Communist forces to the Chunchon area |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the past 24 hours strongly indicate a new offensive effort." It concludes that while the enemy is still capable of launching a major attack along the eastern approaches to Seoul, the |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the past 24 hours strongly indicate a new offensive effort." It concludes that while the enemy is still capable of launching a major attack along the eastern approaches to Seoul, the recent shift of major Chinese Communist forces to the Chunchon area in the central sector points to the Chunchon-Wonju corridor as the |
| 2. | Communist China was excluded. In spite of some reluctance, it is nevertheless expected that all other Asian nations invited to sign a treaty will do so. FAR EAST Major Communist effort seen in central sector: In an estimate of the enemy's capabilities, the US Far East Command states that "the latitude and scale of enemy reconnaissance activity and aggressive patrolling in the past 24 hours strongly indicate a new offensive effort." It concludes that while the enemy is still capable of launching a major attack along the eastern approaches to Seoul, the recent shift of major Chinese Communist forces to the Chunchon area in the central sector points to the Chunchon-Wonju corridor as the projected zone for the enemy's initial major effort. |

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000200260001-0-X1 .

the North Korean V Corps has probably been ordered to join the III Corps in its eastward attack towards the coast. On the west, the North Korean VI Corps is believed to be moving southward into the battle area to support the I Corps. A Chinese prisoner taken on the Kimpo Peninsula states that his unit (possibly an element of a new major Chinese Communist force, the 2nd Army Group) will attempt to outflank the strong UN position at Seoul by launching an attack across the Han River down the weakly-defended Kimpo Peninsula west of Seoul.

NEAR EAST

3. India will probably abstain on strategic embargo against China:

25X1

25X1

25X1

On 16 May, the Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs informed the US Embassy in New Delhi that India's stand regarding an embargo on strategic

materials destined for China would be determined by political considerations and not by its views on armaments. The Secretary-General stated further that while India could hardly vote against a UN resolution in view of its attitude toward peace, it could not easily vote for the resolution after having refused to brand Communist China as an aggressor. He therefore believed it likely that India would abstain.

Comment: India has not looked with favor upon the idea of an embargo against China. Thus, if India abstains from voting on the proposed embargo, it may feel free to deal with China as it sees fit. In any event, India may be expected to interpret the embargo terms in an independent manner.

4. USSR urges Iran to accept planes to combat locust plague:

25X1

The Iranian Minister of Agriculture has advised the US Embassy in Tehran that the USSR is strongly urging Iran to accept the

-4 -

| | | ∠ɔX |
|---|--|-----|
| - | | |
| | | |
| | use of eight small Soviet planes equipped for spreading poison bait. The Iranians are seriously considering the offer. These planes would be used in Eastern Iran, along the route that the locusts usually travel north toward the Soviet border. | • |
| | Comment: In making this offer, the Soviet Government was probably concerned lest the locust plague, which has been unusually severe in Iran this year, spread into the USSR. In April, the Iranians accepted a Soviet offer of two men and some material to assist in combating the plague. The Soviet Government is doubtless aware of the intelligence and propaganda possibilities inherent in its offer. | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | 5 | |

| C T | and an air agreed on for Herminia protoction! |
|---------------|---|
| 6. Iraq | sends an air squadron for "Syria's protection": |
| | On 16 May, the Chief of Operations of the |
| | that the ground elements |
| | of one Iraqi air squadron and a 40 mm. air- |
| crat state | t unit would arrive in Damascus on 17 May. The Iraqi Officer ed that this action was "purely defensive" and only for Syria's pro- |
| tect | on. The US Ambassador in Bagdad is inclined to take the Iraqi |
| Stat Ara | ement at face value, although he recognizes the danger of volatile public opinion and the "subterranean growlings" to the effect that |
| viol | ent action may be the only way of dealing with "repeated Israeli |
| | twelve planes were involved. |
| | Comment: Iraq s precipitous action will |
| exac | erbate the Israeli-Syrian dispute. Syria will derive some en- |
| cour | agement from Iraqi support and, at the same time, the new threat |
| duce will | rally public opinion in Israel. The support given by Iraq will in- other Arab states to consider somewhat more seriously the pos- |
| sibi | lity of doing likewise if for no other reason than to prevent Iraq |
| fron | n achieving a special position in Syria. |
| | |
| | WESTERN EUROPE |
| 7 D | ected French military expenditures for 1952 greater than foreseen: |
| 7. <u>Pro</u> | |
| | According to the US Embassy in Paris, the level of French military expenditures now |
| | being projected for 1952 will probably reach |
| 4.8n m | \$4 billion. This would be 50 percent above 1951 level and 16. 5 percent of the national income. A military |
| | rt of this magnitude is expected to result in a budget deficit of \$3.1 |
| billi | on for 1952. The Embassy comments that the \$2, 1 billion deficit |
| tor | 1951 has already called for at least \$285 million more in infla- ary borrowing than the French say their economy should carry. In |
| | TIA BULLIA MATTE CTOTA CITO TITOTA PICTA CTOTA CONTRACTAL CONTRACTAL CONTRACTAL |

| Decla | assified | in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13 | 3 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0002002600 | 001-0 X1 |
|-------|----------|--|--|----------|
| | | following the October 1950 US-French talks, hesitate to present the US with this projection appointment in the event of later reductions. | n and again risk US dis- | |
| | | Comment: The term for military expenditures in 1952 represents increase over the March ECA estimate for 1901 on which the projected expenditures are base and there is no reason at this time to expect cut back rearmament when it meets in July. | 952. The military programs ed are already under way, | 25X |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | = 7 = | | |

| q | Spanish relations with France near breaking point: |
|----|---|
| o. | Spanish Tetations with Prance hear of caring points. |
| | The US Embassy in Madrid reports that Spanish- |
| | French relations were strained almost to the breaking point by the Spanish Government's |
| • | threat to close French schools in Spain in |
| | retaliation for the French failure to evict Basque Nationalists from a |
| | Spanish government-owned building in Paris. Only General Franco's last-minute decision to "postpone indefinitely" this retaliatory measure |
| | averted the recall of the French Ambassador in Madrid. Spain alleges |
| | that the premises in question are a focal point of Basque anti-Franco |
| | and pro-strike activity. The US Embassy comments that this, together with an anti-French campaign in the Spanish press, marks the inception |
| | of an official campaign to blame the Spanish strikes on French laxity |
| | in controlling anti-Franco "subversive elements" in France. |
| | Comment: The French action in granting |
| ÷ | asylum to active Spanish anti-Franquists has always been considered |
| | by Franco to be a hostile act. The recent upsurge of government strikes in Spain has made him even more sensitive on this point. This |
| | particular incident is part of the larger Spanish effort to shift the blame |
| | for the country's chronic economic ailments to "foreign and Spanish |
| | elements working against the best interests of Spain." In the past, Franco has effectively used appeals to Spanish national pride and latent |
| | xenophobia, but in the present case this tactic would seem to have less |
| | chance of success. |
| | |
| | |
| | |

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/13 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000200260001-0

| en e | |
|--|---|
| 11. Norwegian Foreign NATO: | on Office favors admission of Greece and Turkey to |
| | |
| | The Norwegian Foreign Office will recommend to the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs Com- |
| | mittee of Parliament that Norway support the |
| bership in NATO, | admission of Greece and Turkey to full mem- |
| | 그리는 그 나는 그 가는 가는 일을 하는 그들의 중에 나를 하셨습니다. 중시에 다른 학생 |
| | Comment: The Foreign Office recommends- |
| tion represents a | Comment: The Foreign Office recommenda- complete reversal of Norway's previous position. |
| Heretofore, Norv | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean |
| Heretofore, Norv countries in NAT it and would alter | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |
| Heretofore, Norve countries in NAT it and would alter Communism to a cerned lest the no Norway has broad | complete reversal of Norway's previous position. vay has felt that the inclusion of these Mediterranean O would weaken the defense system by over-extending the nature of the alliance from one primarily against in outright anti-USSR pact. Now, although still con- orthern flank receive only subsidiary treatment, |